Is one trader's share of private front-runs steady, and do they use one middleman?
Research question: Is the 0xae2f...ae13 operator's share of private frontruns stable over time, and does it route through a single builder or relay? Build an operator-level time series that tests whether the 65% concentration reflects one actor's capability or a shared routing dependency.
The records identify the ae13 address as belonging to the operator Jaredfromsubway.eth, as of June 22, 2026 2, which is about four months before today's date. The facts give no per-operator frontrun share, no time series, and no 65% figure, so the stability question cannot be tested. The only routing examples concern other searchers: Wintermute and Symbolic Capital each send more than 95% of their bundles to a single builder 4. Nothing in the facts ties the ae13 operator to a particular builder or relay, and the Blocknative relay footnote concerns a different actor 8. The finding that a small group of integrated builder-searchers has a demonstrable advantage 3 is consistent with a capability explanation, but it does not settle whether this operator's concentration reflects capability or shared routing.
Sources
"The small profits garnered by builders, comprising only a 3.5% share of block rewards, raise concerns that the security assumptions based on builder reputation may introduce new threats to the system."An Empirical Study of Proposer–Builder Separation (PBS) Effects on the Ethereum Ecosystem (2025)
"The operator of a long-running Ethereum MEV bot known as Jaredfromsubway.eth (ae13) has publicly appealed to a hacker to return over $7.5 million in stolen funds"Hacked Ethereum MEV Bot Offers 50% Bounty After $7.5 Million Exploit
"Our empirical results show that a small group of integrated builder-searchers have a demonstrableadvantageintop-of-blockextractioncapability."The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation
"Morethan95%oftheirbundlesaresenttorsync-builder andbeaverbuild,respectively."Private Order Flows and Builder Bidding Dynamics: The Road to Monopoly in Ethereum's Block Building Market
"withTitanandBeaverbuildcapturingacombined87.7%[41]."Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
"toptwobrands(48Club,Blockrazor)controlover87%ofall blocks."MEV in Binance Builder
"Collectively,thesenineflowscontribute64986.14ETHinbribes,"Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
"WenotethatthecoefficientispositiveandsignificantforBlocknativeeventhoughBlocknativeclaims(and industryparticipantsagree)thatitisnotanHFTbuilder."The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation
"As for market share, the top three builders have 85.9% of the market share of all blocks, and 86.8% of the share of MEV."The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction Reordering
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