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Is one trader's share of private front-runs steady, and do they use one middleman?

Research question: Is the 0xae2f...ae13 operator's share of private frontruns stable over time, and does it route through a single builder or relay? Build an operator-level time series that tests whether the 65% concentration reflects one actor's capability or a shared routing dependency.

The records identify the ae13 address as belonging to the operator Jaredfromsubway.eth, as of June 22, 2026 2, which is about four months before today's date. The facts give no per-operator frontrun share, no time series, and no 65% figure, so the stability question cannot be tested. The only routing examples concern other searchers: Wintermute and Symbolic Capital each send more than 95% of their bundles to a single builder 4. Nothing in the facts ties the ae13 operator to a particular builder or relay, and the Blocknative relay footnote concerns a different actor 8. The finding that a small group of integrated builder-searchers has a demonstrable advantage 3 is consistent with a capability explanation, but it does not settle whether this operator's concentration reflects capability or shared routing.

Checked 2026-10-18. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] documented
Builders in the Ethereum PBS ecosystem earn only a 3.5% share of block rewards.
"The small profits garnered by builders, comprising only a 3.5% share of block rewards, raise concerns that the security assumptions based on builder reputation may introduce new threats to the system."
An Empirical Study of Proposer–Builder Separation (PBS) Effects on the Ethereum Ecosystem (2025)
[2] supported
The operator of the hacked MEV bot is identified as Jaredfromsubway.eth with the address ending in ae13.
"The operator of a long-running Ethereum MEV bot known as Jaredfromsubway.eth (ae13) has publicly appealed to a hacker to return over $7.5 million in stolen funds"
Hacked Ethereum MEV Bot Offers 50% Bounty After $7.5 Million Exploit
[3] supported
The authors conclude that a small group of integrated builder-searchers has a demonstrable advantage in top-of-block extraction.
"Our empirical results show that a small group of integrated builder-searchers have a demonstrableadvantageintop-of-blockextractioncapability."
The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation
[4] supported
Wintermute routes more than 95% of its bundles to rsync-builder, and Symbolic Capital Partner routes more than 95% of its bundles to beaverbuild, indicating searcher-to-single-builder routing dependencies.
"Morethan95%oftheirbundlesaresenttorsync-builder andbeaverbuild,respectively."
Private Order Flows and Builder Bidding Dynamics: The Road to Monopoly in Ethereum's Block Building Market
[5] supported
By September 2024, Titan and Beaverbuild together captured a combined 87.7% of the Ethereum builder market.
"withTitanandBeaverbuildcapturingacombined87.7%[41]."
Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
[6] supported
The top two BSC builder brands, 48Club and Blockrazor, together control over 87% of all blocks, while the remaining seven brands account for less than 13%.
"toptwobrands(48Club,Blockrazor)controlover87%ofall blocks."
MEV in Binance Builder
[7] supported
The nine exclusive non-atomic flows contributed about 64,986 ETH in bribes, which is 70.96% of total non-atomic MEV revenue.
"Collectively,thesenineflowscontribute64986.14ETHinbribes,"
Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization
[8] supported
Blocknative's coefficient is positive and significant even though Blocknative says it is not an HFT builder, and a footnote suggests this may be because Blocknative runs its own relay.
"WenotethatthecoefficientispositiveandsignificantforBlocknativeeventhoughBlocknativeclaims(and industryparticipantsagree)thatitisnotanHFTbuilder."
The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation
[9] supported
The top three builders held 85.9% of all block market share and 86.8% of MEV share, which indicates that routing is concentrated in a few builders rather than spread across many.
"As for market share, the top three builders have 85.9% of the market share of all blocks, and 86.8% of the share of MEV."
The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction Reordering