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Have EU or UK rule-makers covered front-running, and who did they call the victim?

Research question: Have non-U.S. market-abuse regulators (such as the EU under MiCA or the UK FCA) addressed transaction ordering or front-running of pending on-chain orders, and how did they define the victim and the harm?

The records show that MiCA expressly prohibits crypto-asset service providers that execute client orders from misusing order information, which addresses front-running 14. MiCA, however, does not apply to fully decentralized protocols, so it does not directly regulate market abuse in DeFi 15, and one German commentary argues that the Article 92 surveillance duty may not reach miners, validators, or MEV agents 1819. The UK's MARC regime treats placing orders that give false or misleading signals, or that secure prices at abnormal levels, as market manipulation 1, and it is civil-only, so intent need not be shown 5. None of the facts define a victim or the harm caused by front-running or transaction ordering, and BaFin's list of applicable MiCA guidelines does not mention front-running at all 21. The newest fact is dated 30 June 2026, about four months before October 2026 910.

Checked 2026-10-22. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] supported
The UK FCA's MARC regime defines market manipulation to include placing orders that give false or misleading signals about supply, demand, or price, or secure prices at abnormal levels.
"Under Regulation 19 of the Cryptoassets Regulations, “market manipulation” means any of the following activities— (a) entering into a transaction, placing an order to trade or engaging in any other behaviour which— (i) gives, or is likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for, or price of, a relevant qualifying cryptoasset or related instrument, or (ii) secures, or i"
The UK Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (“MARC”)
[2] supported
The MARC regime requires UK qualifying cryptoasset trading platforms (UK QCATPs) to monitor all orders received and transmitted to detect suspicious activity.
"The arrangements, systems and procedures must: (1) ensure effective and ongoing monitoring of: (a) all orders received and transmitted on the qualifying cryptoasset trading platform;"
The UK Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (“MARC”)
[3] supported
UK QCATP operators are required to enable the analysis of whether a given order or transaction is suspicious on a case-by-case basis as quickly as practicable.
"(2) enable the UK QCATP operator to analyse as quickly as practicable whether, on a case-by-case basis, a given order, transaction or activity is suspicious;"
The UK Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (“MARC”)
[4] supported
The MARC regime imposes obligations on cryptoasset intermediaries to establish systems for transaction surveillance and reporting suspicious orders and transactions.
"Likewise, there are obligations imposed on cryptoasset intermediaries to establish and maintain effective arrangements, systems and procedures aimed at preventing, detecting and disrupting actual or attempted cryptoasset insider dealing and cryptoasset market manipulation. This includes transaction surveillance and suspicious order and transaction reporting."
The UK Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (“MARC”)
[5] supported
The MARC regime is a civil-only regime that does not require the person engaging in the behavior to have intended to commit market abuse.
"MARC is a civil regime only and under the Cryptoassets Regulations, the relevant designated activities for the purposes of MARC are the use and disclosure of inside information, and market manipulation. The Cryptoassets Regulations do not require the person engaging in the behaviour in question to have intended to commit cryptoasset market abuse."
The UK Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (“MARC”)
[6] supported
The regime defines market abuse through three core prohibitions: prohibited use of inside information, prohibition on disclosure of inside information, and prohibition of market manipulation.
"It defines “market abuse” by reference to three core prohibitions: prohibited use of inside information, prohibition on disclosure of inside information, and prohibition of market manipulation."
UK FCA Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets
[7] supported
The regime prohibits specified persons from using inside information to acquire, dispose of, cancel, or amend orders for relevant qualifying cryptoassets.
"The Regulations prohibit specified persons from using inside information to acquire, dispose of, cancel or amend orders for relevant qualifying cryptoassets or related instruments, and also restrict recommendations or inducements based on inside informatio...n."
UK FCA Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets
[8] supported
Market manipulation under the regime includes conduct such as false or misleading signals, abnormal or artificial price effects, deceptive devices, misleading rumours, and benchmark manipulation.
"Market manipulation: The framework prohibits market manipulation and identifies conduct such as false or misleading signals, abnormal or artificial price effects, deceptive devices, misleading rumours and benchmark manipulation."
UK FCA Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets
[9] supported
The UK FCA's Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets (MARC) prohibits market manipulation in relation to qualifying cryptoassets, with prohibitions applying regardless of whether the behavior occurs in the UK or overseas.
"MARC prohibits insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation in relation to qualifying cryptoassets admitted, or seeking admission, to trading on a UK QCATP. The prohibitions can apply regardless of whether the relevant behaviour takes place in the UK or overseas."
FCA Finalises Core Rules for the UK Cryptoasset Regime
[10] supported
MARC is explicitly adapted for crypto-specific features, including on-chain activity and assets with no traditional issuer, rather than being a direct copy of the traditional UK Market Abuse Regulation.
"MARC is deliberately not a copy-out of UK MAR. It is adapted for crypto-specific features, including cryptoassets with no traditional issuer, decentralised assets and on-chain activity."
FCA Finalises Core Rules for the UK Cryptoasset Regime
[11] supported
Cryptoasset trading platforms (CATPs) and intermediaries are required to implement systems and controls to prevent, detect, and disrupt market abuse, with requirements aligned to traditional finance standards.
"CATPs and intermediaries must implement proportionate systems and controls to prevent, detect, and disrupt market abuse. The rules are based on UK MAR, tailored to the cryptoasset market's unique characteristics."
FCA Publishes Consultation Paper on Proposed Rules Regarding the Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets
[12] supported
Large Cryptoasset Trading Platforms (CATPs) are specifically required to share information with other Large CATPs to detect and prevent market abuse if they have reasonable grounds to suspect it.
"In the CP, it now proposes this requirement only for Large CATPs, who must share information with other Large CATPs without unnecessary delay if they have reasonable grounds to suspect market abuse and disclosure is necessary to detect, prevent, or disrupt it."
FCA Publishes Consultation Paper on Proposed Rules Regarding the Market Abuse Regime for Cryptoassets
[13] supported
Traditional methods to prevent front-running in markets involve after-the-fact investigation and legal action, relying on high fines and lawsuits against firms behaving unethically.
"Traditional methods to prevent front-running mainly involves after the fact investigation and legal action against the front-runners [28]. As mentioned in section 2.2, defining front-running and educating the employees were the first step taken to prevent such issues in traditional markets, however, front-running became less likely to happen mainly because of the high fine and lawsuits against fir"
SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain
[14] supported
The MiCA framework expressly addresses front-running by prohibiting misuse of order information by crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) that execute orders on behalf of clients.
"Prohibition of misuse of order information (including front-running) As quoted above, for CASPs executing orders on behalf of clients, MiCA expressly..."
(PDF) Crypto-Asset Market Abuse Under EU MiCA
[15] supported
MiCA explicitly states that it does not apply to protocols operating in a fully decentralized manner, so it does not directly regulate market abuse in DeFi.
"MiCA explicitly states that it does not apply to protocols operating in a fully decentralized manner"
Market Misconduct in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Analysis, Regulatory Challenges and Policy Implications (2023)
[16] supported
Miners or block validators have discretion over the order of the transactions they prioritise and may select transactions that pay higher fees, which is the mechanism that enables transaction ordering abuse.
"Miners of cryptoassets or block validators have discretion as to the order of transactions they prioritise and may select transactions that pay higher transaction fees."
AN EXERCISE IN UTILITY (TOKENS): GLOBAL SECURITIES REGULATION OF CRYPTOASSETS (2026)
[17] supported
The EU's third consultation package treats most abusive behaviour in cryptoasset markets as following traditional finance patterns, so it applies existing technical requirements with some crypto-specific updates rather than new rules.
"The third consultation package recognises that most abusive behaviours in cryptoasset markets seem to follow patterns of traditional finance Footnote 147 and uses existing technical requirements for arrangements and systems with some updates to provide for crypto-specific features."
AN EXERCISE IN UTILITY (TOKENS): GLOBAL SECURITIES REGULATION OF CRYPTOASSETS (2026)
[18] supported
The document says that, according to a not uncontested view, the MiCAR market-abuse surveillance duty in Art. 92 does not cover blockchain consensus participants such as miners or validators, nor those acting as searchers, builders and relays (together 'MEV agents').
"Nicht im Anwendungsbereich von Art. 92 MiCAR sind nach nicht unbestrittener Ansicht hingegen die Teilnehmer am Konsensmechanismus einer Blockchain, namentlich Miner bzw. Validatoren, sowie Personen, welche die Funktion von Searchers, Builders und Relays ausüben (nachfolgend zusammen „MEV-Agenten“)."
Marktmissbrauch im Kryptomarkt: Eine Einordnung nach MiCAR und Schweizer Finanzmarktrecht (2025)
[19] supported
The author argues that MEV agents should generally not fall under Art. 92 MiCAR unless they perform actual CASP functions, because the wording 'arranging or executing transactions' appears not to leave room for including these functions.
"Zumindest dann, wenn MEV-Agenten keine eigentlichen CASP-Funktionen ausüben, sollten sie nach vorliegender Ansicht nicht von Art. 92 MiCAR erfasst sein."
Marktmissbrauch im Kryptomarkt: Eine Einordnung nach MiCAR und Schweizer Finanzmarktrecht (2025)
[20] supported
ESMA expects PPAETs to have organisational arrangements, systems and procedures for preventing and detecting market abuse under Art. 92(1) MiCAR, and treats the MAR Art. 16 framework for traditional securities markets as the starting point.
"Die Behörde geht grundsätzlich davon aus, dass Art. 16 MAR, der vergleichbare Vorgaben für traditionelle Wertpapiermärkte macht, als Ausgangspunkt zu betrachten ist."
Marktmissbrauch im Kryptomarkt: Eine Einordnung nach MiCAR und Schweizer Finanzmarktrecht (2025)
[21] supported
BaFin's list of applicable ESA guidelines for MiCA includes ESMA guidelines on supervisory practices for preventing and detecting market abuse under MiCA, with an application date of 8 September 2025. The listing does not mention front-running, transaction ordering, or how victims or harm are defined.
"Leitlinien zu den Aufsichtspraktiken der zuständigen Behörden zur Vorbeugung und Aufdeckung von Marktmissbrauch gemäß der Verordnung über Märkte für Kryptowerte ( MiCA )"
Anwendbare Leitlinien der ESAs für MiCAR - Bafin
[22] documented
The MiCAR rules on combating market abuse have applied since 30 December 2024.
"6. Vorschriften zur Bekämpfung von Marktmissbrauch (gelten seit 30. Dezember 2024)"
Aktuelles & Presse - Kryptowerte-Dienstleister: Welche Vereinfachungen und Herausforderungen es jetzt gibt - Bafin
[23] documented
BaFin states that for other tokens whose admission to trading has been applied for, the MiCAR rules on preventing and prohibiting market abuse (Articles 86 ff. MiCAR) apply from the time of the application.
"Bitte beachten Sie, dass für sonstige Token, deren Zulassung zum Handel beantragt wurde, bereits ab dem Zeitpunkt der Beantragung die Regelungen zur Verhinderung und dem Verbot von Marktmissbrauch (Artikel 86 ff MiCAR) gelten."
Kryptoinstitute
[24] supported
MiCAR's stated objectives include increasing investor protection, preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, contributing to market functioning, and preserving financial stability.
"Das Ziel: MiCAR soll den Schutz der Anlegerinnen und Anleger erhöhen, Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung verhindern, zur Funktionsfähigkeit der Märkte beitragen und die Finanzstabilität wahren."
Aktuelles & Presse - Kryptowerte-Dienstleister: Welche Vereinfachungen und Herausforderungen es jetzt gibt - Bafin
[25] supported
Persons who arrange or professionally trade crypto-assets must report to BaFin without delay any well-founded suspicion that market abuse has been, is being, or is likely to be committed in connection with an order or a transaction.
"Sie vermitteln oder führen beruflich Geschäfte mit Kryptowerten aus? Sie haben Hinweise, dass bei einem Auftrag oder einem Geschäft Marktmissbrauch begangen wurde, begangen wird oder wahrscheinlich begangen wird? Dann sind Sie verpflichtet, jeden begründeten Verdacht unverzüglich der Bafin über das MVP -Portal zu melden."
Kryptoinstitute