Answer · confidence: thin
Do failed private trades on Ethereum cost more in fees than they save?
Research question: For private-route submissions on Ethereum, what share fail to land or revert, and do gas and priority fees paid on failed attempts exceed the sandwich losses avoided? Use per-transaction data that nets these costs against the same users' outcomes on public routes.
The records do not give a failure or revert rate for private-route submissions. They note that MEV Blocker cannot guarantee full protection and that about 0.1% of transactions may become public before confirmation 1, and that only the /noreverts, /fullprivacy, and /maxbackruns endpoints offer revert protection 4. No fact reports gas or priority fees paid on failed attempts, and searcher bribes are described as a cost separate from ordinary gas 12, so the fee-versus-avoided-loss comparison cannot be made. The loss figures available are aggregate: about $409,236.97 in private-route victim losses for November–December 2024 9, and roughly $60 million for the twelve months ending October 2025, which the source says is not netted against fees on failed private attempts 2. No fact matches the same users' outcomes on public routes, and the newest dated fact is from October 2025, about a year before the current date 2.
Checked 2026-10-18. Only documented and supported facts are used.
Dig deeper on this questionSources
[1] supported
MEV Blocker's stated goal is to prevent 99% of sandwich attacks, but it cannot guarantee 100% protection, and about 0.1% of transactions may become public before on-chain confirmation because of reorgs or forked blocks.
"Goal of RPC is to prevent 99% of sandwiches but no existing solution can provide full 100% protection. Due to reorgs/forked blocks 0.1% of transactions might become publicly available before on-chain confirmation."MEV Blocker - Everyday protection from harmful MEV
[2] supported
Sandwich attacks are estimated to have imposed about $60 million in cumulative losses over the twelve months ending October 2025, which is an aggregate figure and not a per-transaction netting against fees paid on failed private-route attempts.
"sandwich attacks imposed approximately $60 million in cumulative losses over the twelve months ending October 2025"MEV Is the PFOF of Crypto: An Implicit Tax Per Transaction Working Paper (2026)
[3] supported
The study confirms 2,932 private sandwich attacks (paired frontrun and backrun) in the Nov–Dec 2024 period.
"private sandwich attacks (paired frontrun+backrun): 2,932."Sandwiched and Silent: Behavioral Adaptation and Private Channel Exploitation in Ethereum MEV
[4] supported
The default /fast endpoint does not protect against transaction reverts, so it does not address the failed-transaction risk; only the /noreverts, /fullprivacy, and /maxbackruns endpoints offer revert protection.
"The /noreverts , /fullprivacy , and /maxbackruns endpoints all offer transaction revert protection. The default /fast endpoint focuses on speed and does not protect against reverts."MEV Blocker - Everyday protection from harmful MEV
[5] supported
Private sandwich activity is heavily concentrated on a small set of DEX pools.
"private sandwich activity is heavily concentrated on a small set of DEX pools."Sandwiched and Silent: Behavioral Adaptation and Private Channel Exploitation in Ethereum MEV
[6] supported
One destination address concentrates 856 private victim transactions, about 27% of the total.
"856 victim transactions (27% of total)"Sandwiched and Silent: Behavioral Adaptation and Private Channel Exploitation in Ethereum MEV
[7] supported
The aggregator contract 0x1111...0582 accounts for 467 private sandwich events, and the Uniswap V2 router 0x7a25...488d experiences 397 attacks.
"accounts for 467 events, while the Uniswap V2 router 0x7a25...488d experiences 397 attacks."Sandwiched and Silent: Behavioral Adaptation and Private Channel Exploitation in Ethereum MEV
[8] supported
Churn peaks at 7.5% after a user's first sandwich, then falls to about 1–2%, which the authors attribute partly to survivor bias.
"Churn peaks at 7.5% after the first sandwich"Sandwiched and Silent: Behavioral Adaptation and Private Channel Exploitation in Ethereum MEV
[9] supported
Between November and December 2024, private-route sandwich attacks affected 3,126 victim transactions, with aggregate user losses of about $409,236.97 and attacker profits of about $293,785.95.
"Between November and December 2024 we confirm 2,932 private sandwich attacks (matched frontrun and backrun pairs) affecting 3,126 private victim transactions, with aggregate user losses of $409,236.97 and attacker profits of $293,785.95 ."arxiv.org
[10] supported
According to EigenPhi, sandwich attacks caused traders to lose $87.7 million in the first half of 2022, on a sandwich volume of $54.37 billion.
"According to the data-analysis platform EigenPhi, the volume of sandwich attacks reached $54.37 billion in the first half of 2022, causing traders to lose $87.7 million."MEV on Ethereum: A Policy Analysis - International Center for Law & Economics
[11] supported
Block builders such as Flashbots accept bundles that guarantee all transactions execute in a set order or none execute, which bears on whether failed private attempts occur.
"Through this process, the block builder ensures “that all transactions in a bundle are executed in the set order or none of them are executed."MEV on Ethereum: A Policy Analysis - International Center for Law & Economics
[12] supported
Searchers can pay block builders a fee, called a 'bribe', to include their transactions privately, which is a cost separate from ordinary gas.
"A searcher may offer the block builder a fee (a “bribe”) as an incentive to include a transaction."MEV on Ethereum: A Policy Analysis - International Center for Law & Economics
[13] supported
In one documented sandwich, the trader 0x61 lost about $46,083.7 because the front-run trade moved the Ethereum/DAI exchange rate against them.
"This trade was large enough to affect the Ethereum/DAI exchange rate to such an extent that 0x61 ‘lost’ $46,083.7"MEV on Ethereum: A Policy Analysis - International Center for Law & Economics