Answer ยท confidence: partial
How often do sandwich attacks happen on Ethereum versus private rollups?
Research question: What do labeled sandwich datasets (validated against ground truth rather than naive heuristics) show about prevalence and net returns on Ethereum L1 compared with private-mempool rollups?
The rollup study reports that sandwiching is endemic and profitable on Ethereum L1, but rare, unprofitable, and largely absent on rollups with private mempools 214. Its validation step matters: over 95% of heuristically flagged triples failed economic consistency checks, and the median net return for those rollup attacks is negative 412. The absence on current L2s is attributed to private mempools and medium-value swaps rather than inherent structural protection 8. The records do not give an L1 net-return figure, and the $346M profit figure spans multiple chains, not Ethereum alone 5. Counts for protected flow on Ethereum (30,607) versus Base (1,889) also come from a different study 11. The newest relevant fact is dated 23 September 2026, roughly one to two weeks before October 2026 1113.
Checked 2026-10-18. Only documented and supported facts are used.
Dig deeper on this questionSources
[1] supported
Over 80% of profitable sandwich attacks are 'perfect' (no intermediate transaction between the front-run and back-run), and privately relayed sandwich attacks show no intermediate transaction in almost 99.6% of cases.
"Itisshownthatover80%ofprofitablesandwichattacksareperfectandalsonointermediatetransaction isfoundinalmost99.6%ofprivatelyrelayedsandwichattacks[40]."BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation (2026)
[2] supported
Sandwich attacks are endemic and profitable on Ethereum L1, but rare, unprofitable, and largely absent on rollups with private mempools.
"Our results suggest that sandwiching, while endemic and profitable on Ethereum L1, is rare, unprofitable, and largely absent in rollups with private mempools."How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools (2026)
[3] supported
Simulating a random permutation of transactions within a block cut the revenue from perfect sandwich attacks on Ethereum from about 31,749.59 ETH to 1.74 ETH, which the authors describe as near-complete mitigation.
"We find that the revenue is reduced from a total of 31,749.59 ETH for the historical data to 1.74 ETH, showing almost a complete mitigation success as the attacks are no longer profitable."BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation (2026)
[4] supported
Naive pattern-based heuristics overstate sandwich activity on L2s: over 95% of flagged triples fail economic consistency checks.
"over 95% of flagged triples fail economic consistency checks"How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools (2026)
[5] supported
The attackers behind these protected-flow sandwiches earned over $346M in net profit across the measured chains.
"yieldingattackersover$346Mnetprofit."No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks (2026)
[6] supported
The majority of heuristically flagged sandwich patterns are false positives, and the median net return for these attacks is negative.
"Wefindthatthemajorityofflaggedpatternsarefalse positives and that the median net return for these attacks is negative."How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools (2026)
[7] supported
Reorged Ethereum blocks expose a further 2,875 victims to sandwich attacks, beyond the attacks counted in the main Ethereum total.
"Reorged blocks expose a further 2,875 Ethereum victims."No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks (2026)
[8] supported
The absence of sandwiches on current L2s is attributed to private mempools and medium-value swaps, not to inherent structural protections.
"the empirical absence of sandwiches on current L2s arises from private mempools and medium-value swaps rather than from inherent structural protections."How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools (2026)
[9] supported
The SandWatch paper reports detecting 563,453 sandwich attacks on Ethereum, including 24,404 multi-attack, 4,902 cross-block, and 1,057 pool-failure variants. The snippet does not report net returns or any comparison with private-mempool rollups.
"SandWatch detects 563,453 sandwich attacks, including 24,404 multi-attack, 4,902 cross-block, and 1,057 pool-failure variants, achieving an overall re"SandWatch: Towards Detecting Sandwich Attacks in Ethereum Using a Dual-Task Graph Neural Network
[10] supported
Naive heuristics overstate sandwich activity, and most patterns they flag are false positives.
"Third, using transaction-level data from major rollups, we show that naive heuristics overstate sandwich activity. We find that the majority of flagged patterns are false positives and that the median net return for these attacks is negative."[2601.19570] How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools
[11] supported
The study counted 30,607 sandwich attacks on Ethereum against transactions intended to be protected from front-running, compared with 1,889 on Base and 38,567 on Tron.
"We identify 28.0 million sandwich attacks on Solana, 38,567 on Tron, 30,607 on Ethereum, and 1,889 on Base against transactions intended to be protected from front-running."[2609.28115v1] No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks
[12] supported
The median net return for sandwich attacks in the rollup data is negative.
"We find that the majority of flagged patterns are false positives and that the median net return for these attacks is negative."[2601.19570] How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools
[13] supported
Reorged blocks exposed an additional 2,875 Ethereum victims of sandwich attacks against protected order flow.
"Reorged blocks expose a further 2,875 Ethereum victims."[2609.28115v1] No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks
[14] supported
The authors conclude that sandwiching is endemic and profitable on Ethereum L1, but rare, unprofitable, and largely absent in rollups with private mempools.
"Our results suggest that sandwiching, while endemic and profitable on Ethereum L1, is rare, unprofitable, and largely absent in rollups with private mempools."[2601.19570] How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools
[15] supported
Unlike conventional public-mempool sandwiches, attacks on protected order flow rarely occur tightly around their victims, and outside Solana they are carried out by a small number of entities.
"Unlike conventional public-mempool sandwiches, these attacks rarely occur tightly around their victims and, outside Solana, are carried out by a small number of entities."[2609.28115v1] No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks
[16] supported
Without guaranteed atomic inclusion in private mempools, sandwiching becomes probabilistic rather than deterministic, because attackers must rely on sequencer ordering, redundant submissions, and priority fee placement.
"without guaranteed atomic inclusion, attackers must rely on sequencer ordering, redundant submissions, and priority fee placement, which renders sandwiching probabilistic rather than deterministic."[2601.19570] How to Serve Your Sandwich? MEV Attacks in Private L2 Mempools
[17] supported
On Base, an RPC bug exposed pending transactions, and victim behavior was predictable, creating exposure for protected transactions.
"both an RPC bug that exposes pending transactions and predictable victim behavior on Base."[2609.28115v1] No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks