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In the 1930s, did 7, 10, and 13 percent rules limit country banks more?

Research question: How did the specific reserve requirement tiers (7%, 10%, 13%) impact the lending capacity of country banks versus central reserve city banks during the 1930s financial crises?

The records show that the 7, 10, and 13 percent tiers date from the reserve requirement amendments of about 1917 to 1920, not from the 1930s crises 357. Country banks, subject to the 7 percent tier, held 29 percent of Fed member bank total assets in June 1936, well below the larger city banks 2. Between June 1936 and June 1937, country banks increased their loans by $305 million and their government securities by $350 million, while their reserve-to-asset ratios stayed essentially flat 6. Their reserve deposits rose 35 percent, slightly more than the 31 percent rise at New York's central reserve city banks 4, and simulations attribute the overall rise in reserve demand to a subset of city banks rather than to country banks 8. The sources do not directly measure how each tier limited lending capacity during the 1930s, so the question is only partly answered. The newest fact comes from a 2011 study, about fifteen years before October 2026 8.

Checked 2026-10-22. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] supported
The excerpt indicates that a reserve-requirement power the authorities had not used was limited to central reserve city banks, which bears on how the requirement tiers applied to them rather than to country banks.
"had not exercised was limited to central reserve city banks. Requirements against demand deposits of these"
Monetary, credit, and fiscal policies ; A compendium of materials on monetary, credit, and fiscal policies, page 530
[2] supported
Country banks held 29 percent of the total assets of Fed member banks in June 1936, while central reserve city banks in New York and Chicago and reserve city banks were much larger on average.
"Country banks accounted for 29 percent of the total assets of Fed member banks in June 1936."
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach (2011)
[3] supported
Under the amended Federal Reserve Act, country banks had to hold 7 percent of demand deposits as reserves, the lowest of the three tiers. This source describes the tiers as they stood at the time of the amendment, not during the 1930s.
"For country banks 7 per cent. of demand deposits and 3 per cent. of time deposits."
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, page 948
[4] supported
Between June 1936 and June 1937, country banks' reserve deposits with the Fed rose 35 percent ($350 million), compared with a 31 percent increase for New York's central reserve city banks.
"The reserve deposits of country banks with the Fed rose 35 percent ($350 million) between June 1936 and June 1937, compared with a 31 percent increase for New York’s central reserve city banks."
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach (2011)
[5] documented
Reserve city banks had to hold 10 percent of demand deposits as reserves under the amended requirements.
"For Reserve city banks 10 per cent. of demand deposits and 3 per cent. of time deposits."
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, page 948
[6] supported
Country banks increased their holdings of government securities by $350 million and their loans by $305 million over the year to June 1937, even as their reserve-to-asset ratios stayed essentially flat.
"Moreover, country banks increased their holdings of government securities by $350 million and their loans by $305 million"
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach (2011)
[7] documented
Central reserve city banks, the highest tier, had to hold 13 percent of demand deposits as reserves under the amended requirements.
"For Central Reserve city banks 13 per cent. of demand deposits and 3 per cent. of time deposits."
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, page 948
[8] supported
The simulations indicate that country banks' reserve demands stayed flat because the fundamental determinants of their reserve demand did not prompt them to increase reserves, while the overall rise in reserve demand was driven by a subset of city banks.
"As our simulations show, country banks’ reserve demands remained flat because the fundamental determinants of their reserve demands did not prompt them to increase their reserves."
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? A Microeconomic Approach (2011)