Do studies show whether small coin holders have any say over group money?

"Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are designed to disperse control, yet recent evidence shows that effective governance is often concentrated in a small number of participants."

"One of them could have changed the outcome of 5 of the 9 proposals they voted one."

"We find that author-selected choices gain 58.8 percentage points of voting-power share on average"

"For instance, Messias et al. [21] show thatthereisoftenahighconcentrationofvotingpowerinDAOs,whichleadsto concerns about the equitable distribution of governance tokens."

"who study DAO governance using proposal and vote records and show that a small number"

"The same is true for Uniswap (see Figure 8(b)): Large delegates only exercise their voting power very rarely."

"70% across all proposals (see Table 14) with a peak of 79% for proposals of type Basic (see Table 15)"

"find that large delegates often vote in line with small delegates."

"can shape outcomes in ways that ordinary voters may not easily observe [17]"

"Austgen et al. [4] propose Voting-Bloc Entropy (VBE) as a metric to quantify the decentralization effects of voting blocs, highlighting risks of systemic bribery and vote-buying."

"Note that most potential and exercised voting power of small delegates that can be seen in the figures stems from two proposals with very close outcomes"

"The top-five holders control 67% of holdings, and contract addresses hold roughly half of large-holder positions."

"(ENS governance, on the other hand, more resembles of a decentralized community.)"

"Focusing on both on-chain and off-chain DAOs, we find that an increase in centralization from holding to voting negatively affects DApp performance, confirming that concerns about "shadow-centralization" are warranted."

"In 50 of 55 DAOs, none of the five largest holders ever casts a direct vote, consistent with custodial holdings and delegated voting."

"We also find that this negative impact is mitigated when voters possess greater experience and connectivity than the broader group of token holders."

"quadratic voting is known to be vulnerable to sybil attacks and other forms of malicious coordination [80, 68], and thus may have a centralizing effect: players that are in large voting blocs implicitly subvert the quadratic tax due to the fact that their true token count is split amongst all bloc members."

"a whale can divide her tokens amongst multiple accounts, which increases the impact that her votes have on the election outcome. (In fact, as we show in Section 5.3, a whale can subvert quadratic voting even in the presence of robust identity mechanisms.)"

"As evident in Figure 2, none of the distribution methodologies successfully achieved a Nakamoto coefficient surpassing ... 100 addresses, indicating that none of the projects require a quorum of more than a hundred addresses to effectively enact governance decisions."

"Unsurprisingly, the involvement of early-stage venture capital investors appears to correlate with a higher concentration of governance tokens amongst fewer addresses."

"The somewhat unconventional distribution of YFI in which all tokens were allocated proportionally as stakeholder incentives for application usage has resulted in a reasonable degree of decentralization, albeit favouring wealthy stakeholders."

"Robin Fritsch, Marino Müller, and Roger Wattenhofer. Analyzing voting power in decentralized governance:Whocontrolsdaos?,2022. arXiv:2204.01176."

"Johannes Rude Jensen, Victor von Wachter, and Omri Ross. How decentralized is the governance of blockchain-based finance: Empirical evidence from four governance token distributions, 2021. arXiv: 2102.10096."

"The result is also relevant to concerns that large governance token holders and other vested contributors can shape outcomes in ways that ordinary voters may not easily observe [17]."

"Our main dependent variable is the weekly growth rate of TVL and our independent variable of interest is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of voting power for each DAO, which is lagged by one week."

"We begin with the largest DAOs that sponsored proposals through Snapshot, a dominant off-chain voting platform, during the period running from July 20, 2020 through September 1, 2024. Our final sample includes 570 DAOs with price and volume data for their governance tokens, as well as information on TVL and user counts, which proxy for platform size."