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Can small traders profit from crypto price gaps, or do fast robots take everything?

Research question: Can a small trader realistically earn anything from crypto price gaps on decentralized exchanges, or do the fastest automated players take nearly all of it?

The records suggest the fastest automated players capture most of the value, because in continuous-time trading arbitrageurs compete on speed 9 and the first arbitrageur to trade after a price move captures the profit 3. Small opportunities are common but tiny, since many blocks contain pure-revenue profits under 1% of stealable fees 12, yet a substantial number of blocks contain profits above 20% 14. Competition is costly: only 27.3% of Uniswap arbitrage attempts succeeded, and failed attempts consumed 224 ETH in gas 13, while 46 of 88 cyclic arbitrage implementations had negative revenue 11. The large desk results come from a specialized operation whose gains are lumpy and slowing, as DeFi Technologies cut its 2025 revenue guidance when arbitrage slowed 5 and a single trade's return is expected to be realized over three years 2; the newest fact is a 2026 study dated only to the year 16, so the evidence is roughly a year old at most as of October 2026, and a 2026 study finds that a long-only trader with realistic costs has no detectable edge in small DEX-only tokens 16.

Checked 2026-10-21. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] supported
For PEPE-WETH, CoWSwap trades show significantly positive execution welfare relative to counterfactual V3 trades, exceeding 500 bps for trades smaller than 1 ETH.
"Compared to counterfactual trades executed on V3, all CoWSwap trades exhibit significantly positive welfare, with trades smaller than 1 ETH exceeding 500 bps."
Execution Welfare Across Solver-based DEXes
[2] supported
DeFi Alpha's arbitrage trade was reported as a one-time return of about $3.2 million, but that return is expected to be realized over three years if the trade is held to maturity.
"which is expected to be realized over three years if the trade is held to maturity"
6-K Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFT) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-11-06
[3] supported
On a constant-function AMM, the first arbitrageur to trade after the underlying asset price changes pushes the pool's marginal price to the new equilibrium and captures infra-marginal profit at the liquidity providers' expense.
"When the underlying value of the assets changes, the first arbitrageur who trades with the CFAMM will bring its marginal price (i.e., the price of an arbitrarily small trade) in line with the equilibrium price."
Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response
[4] supported
Solver fills are priced against gas costs that can be significant: the average gas price for the highest-paid swap was about 41.7 Gwei versus 32.5 Gwei for solver gas.
"The average values for green and orange are 41.7 Gwei and 32.5 Gwei correspondingly."
Execution Welfare Across Solver-based DEXes
[5] supported
DeFi Technologies cut its 2025 revenue guidance, partly because arbitrage activity slowed and trading spreads narrowed after digital asset treasury companies proliferated and prices consolidated.
"This adjustment reflects a delay in executing DeFi Alpha arbitrage opportunities as a result of the proliferation of digital asset treasury companies and the consolidation of digital asset prices in the latter half of 2025, which has temporarily reduced arbitrage activity and compressed available trading spreads."
6-K Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFT) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-11-14
[6] supported
DeFi Alpha's total arbitrage trading volume for 2025 up to that point was $27 million.
"The total sum of DeFi Alpha trades for 2025 thus far is $27 million."
6-K Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFT) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-11-06
[7] supported
Sandwich attacks let an attacker profit from a victim's trade by front-running it in the same direction and then back-running it in the opposite direction.
"sandwich attacks in which an attacker front-runs a victim’s swap with a swap in the same direction and then back-runs it with another swap in the opposite direction"
Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response
[8] documented
The company says the growth of digital asset treasury companies in the second half of 2025 delayed its pipeline of arbitrage opportunities and compressed its arbitrage profits.
"With the proliferation of digital asset treasury companies in the latter half of 2025, the Company experienced delays in its pipeline of arbitrage opportunities and compressed arbitrage profits."
6-K Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFT) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-11-14
[9] supported
Under a batch-trading design, arbitrageurs compete on price rather than on speed, whereas in continuous-time trading they compete on speed, which favors the fastest automated players.
"The main result is that when trading happens in continuous time, arbitrageurs compete on speed. When traders are instead batched (that is, collected over a given time interval and then settled), arbitrageurs compete on price"
Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response
[10] documented
About 3.6% of Ethereum blocks since block 3,875,490 contained at least one pure-revenue arbitrage transaction on decentralized exchanges.
"Of all blocks since block 3,875,490 (the first block we observed with a pure revenue OO fee from decentralized exchange arbitrage), approximately 3.6% contain at least one pure revenue arbitrage transaction."
Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability (2020)
[11] supported
Of 88 sequential implementations of cyclic arbitrage, 46 had negative revenue, because external transactions changed market prices during the arbitrage.
"Consequently, 46 out of 88 se-"
Cyclic Arbitrage in Decentralized Exchanges (2022)
[12] supported
Most of the arbitrage opportunities that small traders could capture are small price differences from normal trading across exchanges, with many blocks containing pure-revenue profits worth under 1% of total stealable fees.
"Of these blocks, 17,897 blocks contain pure revenue OO profits that are < 1% of the total stealable fees, confirming our earlier conclusions that the most frequent pure revenue arbitrage opportunities are for small price differences in the course of normal trading across exchanges."
Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability (2020)
[13] supported
On Uniswap, traders made 36,492 arbitrage attempts through public smart contracts, and only 27.3% succeeded (9,955 of 36,492), with traders spending 224 ETH on gas for failed transactions.
"yieldingasuccessrateof27.3%(9,955outof36,492)."
Cyclic Arbitrage in Decentralized Exchanges (2022)
[14] documented
Despite the many small opportunities, a substantial number of blocks contained large arbitrage profits, with 36,860 blocks having pure-revenue fees above 20% of total stealable fees.
"Nonetheless, many blocks do contain substantial pure revenue fees. 36,860 observed blocks contain pure revenue fees that exceed 20% of total stealable fees"
Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability (2020)
[15] supported
Cyclic arbitrageurs as a whole earned a net profit of 21,360 ETH including failed attempts, with 66% of them having a positive balance.
"cyclicarbitrageursis21,360ETH(upperbound:25,742ETH),"
Cyclic Arbitrage in Decentralized Exchanges (2022)
[16] supported
A long-only trader who accounts for realistic costs has no detectable edge that price information can supply in small, mostly non-CEX-listed DEX tokens.
"a long-only, realistically-costed trader has no detectable edge that price information can supply"
No Edge Without Information: An Empirical Study of Tradeability in Decentralized-Exchange-Only Cryptocurrencies (2026)
[17] supported
DeFi Alpha, a specialized arbitrage trading desk run by DeFi Technologies, generated about C$113.8 million (US$83.4 million) from arbitrage trades in Q2 2024 up to the announcement.
"which has successfully generated approximately C$113.8 million (US$83.4 million) thus far in Q2 from low-risk arbitrage trades, marking a robust start for this new venture."
40FR12B Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFT, DEFTF) (CIK 0001888274) 2024-09-16
[18] documented
DeFi Alpha, the company's in-house arbitrage desk, earned a one-time return of about C$30.2 million (US$22 million) from a single arbitrage trade.
"generated a one-time return of approximately C$30.2 million (US$22 million) from an arbitrage trade."
40FR12B/A Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFTF) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-05-07
[19] supported
Price-based timing shows no detectable edge at any horizon, and real data usually performs worse than its own bar-shuffled null.
"Price-based timing shows no detectable edge at any horizon (intraday, swing, cross-sectional, cross-chain): real data performs no better than, and usually worse than, its own shuffle"
No Edge Without Information: An Empirical Study of Tradeability in Decentralized-Exchange-Only Cryptocurrencies (2026)
[20] supported
In its first year of operations, DeFi Alpha reported C$132.1 million (US$96.8 million) in revenue from systematic arbitrage trading.
"generated C$132.1 million (US$96.8 million) in revenue through systematic arbitrage trading"
40FR12B/A Defi Technologies, Inc. (DEFTF) (CIK 0001888274) 2025-05-07
[21] supported
Strategies practitioners commonly use, such as market-neutral hedging, launch timing, liquidity provision, cross-pool arbitrage, and order flow, fail net of cost.
"The strategies practitioners actually use fail too, net of cost (market-neutral hedging, launch timing, liquidity provision, cross-pool arbitrage, regime conditioning, portfolio aggregation, and order flow)"
No Edge Without Information: An Empirical Study of Tradeability in Decentralized-Exchange-Only Cryptocurrencies (2026)
[22] supported
The median strategy loses money even at zero transaction cost.
"the median strategy loses even at zero cost"
No Edge Without Information: An Empirical Study of Tradeability in Decentralized-Exchange-Only Cryptocurrencies (2026)
[23] supported
The one signal that beats its null, a machine-learning ranker, mainly flags which coins will crash rather than which will rise.
"its predictability is concentrated in the lower tail (it flags which coins crash, not which rise)"
No Edge Without Information: An Empirical Study of Tradeability in Decentralized-Exchange-Only Cryptocurrencies (2026)