Answer · confidence: thin

Who is fighting in eastern Congo in late 2026, and is any ceasefire holding?

Research question: What is the current status of the fighting in eastern DR Congo, including who is fighting, where, and whether any ceasefire is holding as of late 2026?

The records show that the DRC government and AFC/M23 signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 15, 2025 ¹. The most recent record, dated August 24, 2026, reports that the two sides agreed a peace roadmap as Doha talks sought to regain momentum ², which is about two months before October 2026. A ceasefire oversight mechanism was made operational to monitor a permanent ceasefire, but the statement does not describe the ceasefire's actual on-the-ground condition ⁸. The first ceasefire verification mission was scheduled for August 24, 2026, in Minembwe ⁵, and the parties agreed on a standardized method for reporting alleged violations ¹⁰. The records do not describe current fighting, its locations beyond Minembwe, or whether the ceasefire is holding as of late 2026; the only fighting described is historical, with M23 clashing with the Congolese army (FARDC) in North Kivu in 2012 and 2013 ¹⁹.

Checked 2026-10-20. Only documented and supported facts are used.

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Sources

[1] supported

The DRC government and AFC/M23 signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 15, 2025.

"signed in Doha on November 15, 2025."

DRC Government and AFC/M23 Issue Doha Process Statement

[2] supported

The DRC government and the M23 group agreed a peace roadmap as Doha talks sought to regain momentum.

"DRC, M23 agree peace roadmap as Doha talks seek to regain momentum"

DRC, M23 agree peace roadmap as Doha talks seek to regain momentum

[3] supported

Representatives of the DRC government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from August 17 to 21, 2026, to assess progress and challenges under the Doha Process.

"convened in Switzerland to assess progress made and challenges encountered to date in the framework of the Doha Process."

DRC Government and AFC/M23 Issue Doha Process Statement

[4] supported

Representatives of the DRC government and the AFC/M23 movement met in Montreux, Switzerland, from April 13 to April 17, 2026, to implement the Doha Framework peace agreement.

"From April 13 to April 17, representatives from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23), along with the United States of America, the State of Qatar, the Republic of Togo (as the African Union mediator), the African Union Commission, and Switzerland, convened in Montreux, Switzerland"

Joint Statement on Progress Between the Representatives of Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Protocol on Humanitari

[5] supported

The first ceasefire verification mission by the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) was scheduled for August 24, 2026, in Minembwe.

"the first EJVM+ ceasefire verification mission, scheduled for August 24 in Minembwe."

DRC Government and AFC/M23 Issue Doha Process Statement

[6] documented

The Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the DRC government and AFC/M23 was signed in Doha on November 15, 2025.

"pursuant to the provisions of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23, signed in Doha on November 15, 2025."

[7] supported

The EJVM+ reconnaissance mission, supported logistically by MONUSCO, was conducted on August 20, 2026, ahead of the planned ceasefire verification mission.

"with the logistical support of MONUSCO, conducted on August 20 in advance of the first EJVM+ ceasefire verification mission"

DRC Government and AFC/M23 Issue Doha Process Statement

[8] supported

A ceasefire oversight mechanism was made operational to monitor and verify a permanent ceasefire between the two parties, though the statement does not describe the ceasefire's actual on-the-ground condition.

"The operationalization of the EJVM+ allows for the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM), established within the Doha Framework, to begin conducting surveillance, monitoring, verification, and reporting on the implementation of the permanent ceasefire between the Parties."

[9] supported

The article lists the outcome of the conflict as the signing of a peace agreement between the DR Congo and Rwanda.

"signature d'un accord de paix entre la république démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda"

Conflit entre la république démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda

[10] supported

The parties agreed on the importance of a standardized method for reporting alleged ceasefire violations, and they reaffirmed their commitment to continue negotiations toward comprehensive peace.

"The Parties agreed on the importance of a standardized method for reporting allegations of ceasefire violations."

DRC Government and AFC/M23 Issue Doha Process Statement

[11] supported

The DRC government and the AFC/M23 signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 15, 2025.

"the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the DRC and AFC/M23, signed in Doha on November 15, 2025."

Joint Statement Between the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Representatives of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23) on the Doha Proce

[12] documented

The parties agreed to release prisoners within ten days under a Mechanism for the Liberation of Detainees signed on September 14, 2025, as a confidence-building step.

"Parties also agreed within ten days to release prisoners consistent with the Mechanism for the Liberation of Detainees signed on 14 September 2025 to continue building confidence."

[13] documented

The first ceasefire verification mission by the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) was scheduled for August 24 in Minembwe.

"in advance of the first EJVM+ ceasefire verification mission, scheduled for August 24 in Minembwe."

[14] supported

Armed groups finance themselves partly through small-scale gold mining, and the Dodd-Frank enactment did not significantly deter that financing on average.

"Dodd-Frank enactment did not significantly reduce conflict in gold mining areas or weaken the positive association between conflict and gold prices, suggesting no average deterrence of armed-group financing from small-scale gold mining."

Are Audits Shifting the Battleground? Supply Chain Certifications and Conflict Dynamics in the Congo (2023)

[15] documented

The parties agreed on the importance of a standardized method for reporting alleged ceasefire violations.

"The Parties agreed on the importance of a standardized method for reporting allegations of ceasefire violations."

[16] supported

The DRC government and AFC/M23, with mediators including Qatar, the United States, Togo as African Union mediator, Switzerland and the African Union Commission, met in Switzerland to assess progress and challenges in the Doha Process.

"convened in Switzerland to assess progress made and challenges encountered to date in the framework of the Doha Process."

[17] supported

Across whole territories, auditing produced no corresponding aggregate change in conflict intensity or growth, and the gold price–conflict link may have strengthened as armed groups adapted to audits.

"At the territorial level, we find no corresponding aggregate change in conflict intensity or growth; if anything, the gold price–conflict gradient strengthens with audit exposure, consistent with strategic adaptation by armed groups to avoid adverse audit outcomes."

Are Audits Shifting the Battleground? Supply Chain Certifications and Conflict Dynamics in the Congo (2023)

[18] documented

The parties agreed that the order in which protocols are negotiated does not determine the order in which they are implemented.

"The Parties agreed that the order of negotiation of the protocols does not dictate the order of implementation of the protocols."

[19] supported

The M23 rebel group formed in 2012 and fought heavy combat with the Congolese army (FARDC) in 2012 and 2013, particularly in North Kivu.

"which saw heavy combat with the FARDC in 2012 and 2013, particularly in North Kivu."

Mineral Supply Chain and Conflict Links in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (2015)

[20] supported

Vogel argues that iTSCi produced outcomes counter to its aims, including new corruption, resistance to regulation, recycling of wartime elites, and rising unemployment that aided armed group recruitment, leading to more rather than less violence.

"His core argument is that iTSCi has produced a range of outcomes counter to its stated objectives. This has created, Vogel contends, new processes of marginalization and exclusion, while leading to more, not less, violence."

Conflict Minerals Inc.: War, Profit and White Saviourism in Eastern Congo. Christoph N. Vogel (2024)

[21] supported

The Bakata Katanga armed group was operative in nearly all eastern territories and significantly affected artisanal mining activities.

"The Bakata Katanga is operative in nearly all eastern territories with a significant impact on ASM activities."

Mineral Supply Chain and Conflict Links in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (2015)

[22] supported

Non-state armed group interference affected mines producing at least a fifth of eastern DRC's gold production.

"Weekly production estimates indicate that non-state armed group interference affects mines producing at least a fifth of eastern DRC’s gold production."

Mineral Supply Chain and Conflict Links in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (2015)