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Are M23 rebels still fighting in North and South Kivu after 2026 peace deals?

Research question: What is the current status of the M23 armed group and the latest ceasefire agreements in North and South Kivu as of late 2026?

The records show that M23 controls large areas of North Kivu and South Kivu, having seized Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu weeks later 23. The Doha Framework Agreement, mediated by Qatar, was signed in November 2025, and on 2 February 2026 the Congolese authorities and M23 signed terms of reference for a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism 4. An initial team of UN peacekeepers was to be deployed to Uvira in South Kivu to support that mechanism, a limited role that does not mean MONUSCO has returned to the province it left in June 2024 10. The newest fact in the record dates from 5 February 2026, so the records do not establish the situation as of late 2026 10. The M23 has pursued de facto control and autonomy in eastern Congo, while the government seeks to keep territorial integrity and central authority 8.

Checked 2026-10-19. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] supported
The two parties settled on a ceasefire and monitoring mechanism in October, and on 15 November they signed a framework agreement for a peace deal.
"In October, the two parties settled on a ceasefire and monitoring mechanism, and on 15 November, they signed a framework agreement for a peace deal."
The M23 Offensive: Elusive Peace in the Great Lakes
[2] supported
M23 controls large areas of North Kivu and South Kivu, and after a rapid offensive in January 2025 it seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu.
"In January 2025, after a rapid offensive, the group seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu."
M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists
[3] supported
Weeks after taking Goma, M23 captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, and has since set up parallel administrations in the areas it controls.
"Weeks later, it captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. Since then, the rebels have set up parallel administrations in areas under their control."
M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists
[4] supported
On 2 February 2026, the Congolese authorities and M23 signed terms of reference for a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism under the Doha Framework Agreement, which was signed in November 2025 and is mediated by Qatar.
"On 2 February, the Congolese authorities and M23 signed a document setting out the terms of reference for a ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism under the Doha Framework Agreement, signed in November 2025."
M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists
[5] documented
The M23 Movement was formed in 2012 by Ntaganda and former CNDP members, who said the March 23, 2009 peace agreement had not been implemented.
"Yet, in 2012, Ntaganda and former CNDP members established the M23 Movement, claiming that the agreement had not been implemented."
Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement (2026)
[6] supported
Hostilities by the M23 resumed in March 2022, and DRC-Rwanda diplomatic relations have deteriorated since then.
"since the resumption of hostilities by the M23 in March 2022 and the multiple efforts made both at the regional and international levels to achieve the return of peace to the East of the DRC, diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda have continued to deteriorate overnight"
The Geopolitical and Legal Issues of the Intervention of the Wazalendo in The East of the DRC Against the M23 Rebellion Supported By Rwanda (2026)
[7] supported
Presidents Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC and Paul Kagame of Rwanda signed the Washington Agreements in December 2025, though the UN said the security situation remained volatile at the start of 2026.
"In December, Presidents Félix Tshisekedi of the DRC and Paul Kagame of Rwanda signed the Washington Agreements, raising hopes of an end to the fighting. However, the UN says the security situation at the start of this year remains volatile and continues to deteriorate."
M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists
[8] supported
The M23 has pursued de facto control and autonomy in eastern Congo, while the Congolese government seeks to keep territorial integrity and central authority.
"While the Congolese government seeks to maintain territorial integrity and central authority, the M23 Movement has pursued de facto control and autonomy in eastern Congo."
Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement (2026)
[9] supported
Two parallel peace processes, the Luanda process (Angola) and the Nairobi process (Kenya), were launched, with the Nairobi process focusing on armed groups and the Luanda process on DRC-Rwanda political relations.
"It should be noted, however, that while the “Nairobi process” focuses on armed groups, the “Luanda process” addresses political relations between the DRC and Rwanda."
The Geopolitical and Legal Issues of the Intervention of the Wazalendo in The East of the DRC Against the M23 Rebellion Supported By Rwanda (2026)
[10] supported
An initial team of UN peacekeepers was to be deployed to Uvira in South Kivu to support the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, a limited role that does not mark a permanent return to the province MONUSCO left in June 2024.
"She said an initial team of UN peacekeepers would be deployed to the town of Uvira, in South Kivu, to support the monitoring mechanism. MONUSCO stressed, however, that this would not mark a permanent return to the province, which the Mission left in June 2024, but a limited and strictly defined role linked to the ceasefire process."
M23 rebels: UN sees progress in talks but warns violence persists
[11] supported
Strategic minerals such as coltan, gold, and cobalt in North Kivu have funded armed groups and strengthened cross-border collaboration among them.
"Strategic minerals such as coltan, gold, and cobalt in North Kivu have not only funded armed groups but also strengthened cross-border collaborations among them."
Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement (2026)
[12] supported
The 2013 Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region has not been implemented.
"the 2013 “Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region”, which has not been implemented"
The Geopolitical and Legal Issues of the Intervention of the Wazalendo in The East of the DRC Against the M23 Rebellion Supported By Rwanda (2026)
[13] supported
Arms and logistical support have increased the intensity and persistence of the M23 conflict, helping the group maintain its military capacity and expand its area of influence.
"The provision of arms and logistical support has increased both the intensity and persistence of the conflict."
Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement (2026)
[14] supported
The M23 increasingly behaves like a conventional army with more sophisticated firepower, rather than a simple armed group.
"the M23 is behaving more and more like a conventional army because it has increasingly sophisticated firepower"
The Geopolitical and Legal Issues of the Intervention of the Wazalendo in The East of the DRC Against the M23 Rebellion Supported By Rwanda (2026)
[15] supported
Regional diplomatic engagement has helped the M23 maintain its presence and made it harder to dismantle or isolate the group internationally.
"Regional diplomatic engagement has enabled the M23 Movement to maintain its presence, complicating efforts to dismantle or isolate it internationally."
Congo: Conflict Dynamics and Cross-Border Regional Interaction. The M23 Movement (2026)
[16] supported
M23 is an armed group that has been active since 2012 in eastern DRC.
"un groupe armé qui sévit depuis 2012 dans l'est de la république démocratique du Congo (RDC)"
Bertrand Bisimwa
[17] supported
After M23 captured Goma, its leaders Bertrand Bisimwa and Corneille Nangaa said they intended to keep their presence in Goma and that their ultimate goal remained taking Kinshasa and overthrowing President Félix Tshisekedi.
"Ils soulignent également que leur objectif ultime reste la prise de Kinshasa et le renversement du président Félix Tshisekedi"
Bertrand Bisimwa
[18] supported
A ceasefire agreement negotiated between Kinshasa and Kigali took effect on 4 August 2024, but the M23 continued its advance and seized new localities in Rutshuru territory.
"Malgré l'entrée en vigueur le 4 août 2024 , d'un accord de cessez-le-feu négocié entre Kinshasa et Kigali , le M23 poursuit sa progression, prenant le contrôle de nouvelles localités dans le territoire de Rutshuru ."
Mouvement du 23 mars
[19] supported
The paper argues that Rwanda uses proxy forces such as M23 to sustain destabilization and enable illicit exploitation of resources in eastern DRC.
"Rwanda promotes sustained destabilization through proxy forces such as the M23"
The M23 rebels and the dynamics of protracted armed conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (2026)
[20] supported
According to the DRC government, M23 is a terrorist group supported by the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF).
"According to DRC government, M23 is a terrorist group supported by Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF)."
Drivers of Chaos in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Warfare (2023)
[21] supported
In November 2013, M23 announced an end to its rebellion after being defeated by government forces, and Bisimwa ordered preparation for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.
"Le 5 novembre , le groupe armé annonce mettre un terme à la rébellion"
Bertrand Bisimwa
[22] supported
A peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was signed in Washington on 27 June 2025.
"Le 27 juin 2025 , un Accord de paix entre la république démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda , est signé à Washin"
Mouvement du 23 mars
[23] supported
The author argues that earlier disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts in the DRC did not achieve the expected results for peacebuilding and state building.
"did not yield expected results in terms of peacebuilding and state building."
Drivers of Chaos in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Warfare (2023)
[24] supported
The Alliance Fleuve Congo, a coalition including the M23, announced a unilateral ceasefire in February 2025, but fighting resumed two days later.
"Le 3 février , l’ Alliance fleuve Congo (AFC), une coalition incluant le M23, annonce un cessez-le-feu unilatéral, mais les combats reprennent le 5 février ."
Mouvement du 23 mars
[25] supported
Between May and August 2022, the Congolese army fought Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu alongside a coalition of Congolese militia and the FDLR. This is historical context only and does not address the current situation.
"Between May and August 2022, the Congolese army with a coalition of Congolese militia as well as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) fought against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels in North Kivu province [8]."
The Sacralization of Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: A Predator’s Governance (2023)