Answer · confidence: partial
Is China, the African Union, or UN peacekeepers actually stopping the fighting?
Research question: What specific roles are China, the African Union, and UN peacekeepers playing in mediating the current conflict, and what have been their recent achievements or failures?
No verified fact in the record describes a mediating role for China, so that part of the question cannot be answered from these sources. The African Union's role has centred on Angolan President João Lourenço, designated as facilitator with the Luanda summits held under his mediation from 2022 3. The Luanda track did relaunch an enhanced verification mechanism in Goma in November 2024 12, but the M23 seized Kanyabusoro shortly after the Luanda ceasefire agreement, violating it on the ground 8, and Angola later announced it was ending its DRC-Rwanda mediation 5. UN peacekeepers under MONUSCO are authorised to support a permanent ceasefire 1 and support the EJVM+ verification mechanism 6, yet no monitoring deployment has been achieved and the Uvira mission remains exploratory 13. The newest fact in the record is dated 31 March 2026, roughly six months before October 2026 21.
Checked 2026-10-22. Only documented and supported facts are used.
Dig deeper on this questionSources
[1] supported
MONUSCO is authorised under Security Council resolution 2808 (2025) to support implementation of a permanent ceasefire in the DRC.
"MONUSCO recalls that, under Security Council resolution 2808 (2025), the Mission is authorised to support the implementation of a permanent ceasefire."PDF JOINT PRESS RELEASE - icglr.org
[2] documented
Doha-facilitated talks between the DRC government and the AFC/M23 reached agreement on detailed Terms of Reference to operationalize the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism.
"including agreement on detailed Terms of Reference to operationalize the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism established under the ceasefire framework."PDF CP/ OSMR/2026 Office of the Spokesperson and Media Relations
[3] supported
The African Union designated Angolan President João Lourenço as facilitator, and the Luanda summits were held under his mediation.
"sous la médiation du président angolais João Lourenço , désigné comme facilitateur par l’ Union Africaine ."Processus de Luanda
[4] supported
Under Security Council resolution 2808 (2025), MONUSCO is explicitly authorized to support a permanent ceasefire, including through its participation in the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism.
"in accordance with Security Council resolution 2808 (2025), the Mission is explicitly authorized to support the implementation of a permanent ceasefire, including through its participation in the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM)"PDF CP/ OSMR/2026 Office of the Spokesperson and Media Relations
[5] supported
Angola announced it was ending its mediation between the DRC and Rwanda, two months after taking over the chairmanship of the African Union.
"Le 24 mars 2025 , l'Angola annonce cesser sa médiation entre la république démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda, deux mois après avoir pris la tête de l'Union africaine"Processus de Luanda
[6] supported
MONUSCO supports the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), which was created after the Doha Framework for Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 15 November 2025.
"the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+) created following the signing of the Doha Framework for Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 15th November 2025."PDF JOINT PRESS RELEASE - icglr.org
[7] supported
MONUSCO provides technical and logistical support to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus.
"by providing technical and logistical support to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+)."PDF CP/ OSMR/2026 Office of the Spokesperson and Media Relations
[8] supported
Shortly after the Luanda ceasefire agreement, the M23 seized Kanyabusoro in Rutshuru territory, violating the ceasefire on the ground.
"Cependant dés le lendemain, le cessez-le-feu est immédiatement violé sur le terrain, où le Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) s'empare de Kanyabusoro"Processus de Luanda
[9] supported
Unlike in North Kivu and Ituri, MONUSCO's mandate in South Kivu is limited to ceasefire monitoring and does not include Protection of Civilians.
"Unlike in North Kivu and Ituri, MONUSCO's mandate in South Kivu is strictly focused on ceasefire monitoring and does not encompass Protection of Civilians (POC), according to Resolution 2808 (2025)."PDF JOINT PRESS RELEASE - icglr.org
[10] supported
The reference list cites a 2013 IPI Global Observatory piece saying the M23 surrender was a big victory but did not end Congo's troubles.
"Vogel, C. (2013). Big victory as M23 Surrenders, but not an end to Congo’s travails."Operações de estabilização e prolongamento dos conflitos armados: estudo de caso do retorno do M23 na República Democrática do Congo (2024)
[11] supported
The African Union and its Mediator are among the mediating actors whose sustained engagement MONUSCO welcomed, alongside Qatar, the United States, and regional bodies.
"the African Union and its Mediator, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)."PDF CP/ OSMR/2026 Office of the Spokesperson and Media Relations
[12] supported
The Luanda-mediated ad hoc verification mechanism was relaunched in an enhanced form in Goma by the DRC and Rwandan foreign ministers.
"le 5 novembre 2024 , à Goma , les ministres des Affaires étrangères de la RDC et du Rwanda lancent officiellement le Mécanisme de vérification ad hoc renforcé (MVA-R) sous médiation angolaise"Processus de Luanda
[13] supported
The joint MONUSCO–ICGLR mission to Uvira is an exploratory phase, and the size of any later deployment depends on agreed parameters, security guarantees and operational requirements; no monitoring deployment has yet been achieved.
"the Mission emphasises that this is an exploratory phase; the configuration of any subsequent deployment will be determined by agreed parameters, security guarantees, and operational requirements."PDF JOINT PRESS RELEASE - icglr.org
[14] documented
MONUSCO says it has strengthened its internal readiness to support the ceasefire monitoring architecture, but only within its Security Council mandate and with respect for DRC sovereignty.
"strictly within the limits of its Security Council mandate and in full respect of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo."PDF CP/ OSMR/2026 Office of the Spokesperson and Media Relations
[15] documented
MONUSCO and ICGLR say credible ceasefire monitoring requires freedom of movement and predictable security guarantees, which remain unresolved and central to the assessment.
"MONUSCO and ICGLR reaffirm that credible monitoring requires enabling conditions, including freedom of movement and predictable security guarantees, which remain central to the ongoing assessment."PDF JOINT PRESS RELEASE - icglr.org
[16] supported
MONUSCO, the UN stabilization mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is among the largest and most resource-intensive UN peacekeeping missions.
"especially the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) as one of the largest and most resource-intensive missions."UN and African Union Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the DR Congo and Other Regional Cases (2025)
[17] supported
The study concludes that UN and African Union cooperation needs to be strengthened at both institutional and operational levels.
"the conclusion about the necessity to enhance their cooperation at both institutional and operational levels."UN and African Union Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the DR Congo and Other Regional Cases (2025)
[18] supported
The African Union is among the actors that backed the framework agreement between the DRC government and the AFC/M23, though the document says that agreement was fragile and still needed further efforts toward lasting peace.
"reçoit le soutien des États-Unis, de l’Union africaine et de plusieurs acteurs régionaux."Processus de Doha
[19] supported
The M23 offensive in the DRC, which began in January 2025, has involved credible reports of atrocities against civilians and attacks against UN peacekeepers.
"which started in January 2025 and is characterised by credible reports of atrocities against civilians and attacks against peacekeepers."Three Legal Issues on First Reading of Resolution 2773 (2025) on Eastern DRC (2025)
[20] supported
In November 2013, UN peacekeepers from MONUSCO fought alongside the Congolese army in a joint campaign that defeated the M23 rebellion.
"En novembre 2013 , la rébellion est vaincue par une campagne conjointe de l'armée congolaise et de la MONUSCO , la force locale de maintien de la paix des Nations unies ."Processus de Doha
[21] supported
The author judges that these recent interventions have failed, which reflects a lingering trust deficit among the regional states.
"However, the failure of these interventions also reflects the lingering trust deficit among the regions."Resource Sovereignty, Regional Security, and Political Economy of Violence in Eastern DRC (2026)
[22] supported
The source says that tensions make conflict resolution difficult because each party lacks commitment to carrying out obligations agreed in mediation.
"The tensions that arise make it difficult to resolve conflicts due to the lack of commitment from each party to carry out the obligations that"Civil War in South Sudan: Conflict Resolution through Mediation by the African Union (2024)
[23] supported
The resurgence of the M23 rebellion is cited as evidence of the institutionalised conflict and compromised sovereignty in the region.
"which is evident with the resurgence of M23 rebellion"Resource Sovereignty, Regional Security, and Political Economy of Violence in Eastern DRC (2026)