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Which court ruling set the test for a president firing commission members?

Research question: What have appeals courts said when a president removed members of a multi-member commission, and which ruling set the test for those removals?

The records show that the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, denied the government's motion for a stay of Gwynne Wilcox's reinstatement, reasoning that the Supreme Court's statements that Humphrey's Executor remains precedential required that result 2. The Ninth Circuit panel in Seila Law affirmed the district court and treated Humphrey's Executor and Morrison as controlling on for-cause removal 18. The test itself traces to the Supreme Court's 1935 Humphrey's Executor decision, which upheld FTC commissioner protections and limited Myers to "purely executive" offices 17. Seila Law (2020) later confined Humphrey's Executor to multimember agencies that do not wield substantial executive power 9. In Trump v. Slaughter, decided June 29, 2026, the majority held that heads of multi-member agencies exercising executive power may be removed at will and declared that any remaining Humphrey's Executor is overruled 2214, so the newest fact is about three months old as of October 2026.

Checked 2026-10-21. Only documented and supported facts are used.
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Sources

[1] supported
In Humphrey's Executor (1935), the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that limiting the President's power to remove FTC commissioners to cases of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office did not violate the Constitution.
"In an opinion written by Justice George Sutherland , the Court ruled that it was not a violation of the Constitution for the FTC Act to limit the power of the President to remove FTC commissioners only to situations involving "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office""
Humphrey's Executor v. United States
[2] supported
The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Supreme Court's statements that Humphrey's Executor remains precedential required denying the government's motion for a stay of the reinstatement of Gwynne Wilcox.
"The government sought a stay of the district court opinion in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit), which, sitting en banc, held that “[t]he Supreme Court’s repeated and recent statements that Humphrey’s Executor . . . remain[s] precedential” required denial of the motion."
PDF Trump v. Slaughter and the Future of For- Cause Removal Protections
[3] supported
In Myers v. United States (1926), the Supreme Court held that the President has exclusive authority to remove executive "administrative officers," and the Take Care Clause generally limits Congress from restricting that power.
"The President has the exclusive authority to remove "administrative officers" and the Take Care Clause generally limits Congress from restricting this power."
Myers v. United States
[4] supported
The Court's opinion says that the members of three early agencies that the dissent cited as semi-independent were also removable by the President at will.
"But the members of these agencies, too, were removable by the President at will."
PDF 25-332 Trump v. Slaughter (06/29/2026) - Supreme Court of the United States
[5] supported
Several of Trump's early second-term actions dismissed heads or commissioners of independent agencies, which led to lawsuits challenging those dismissals under Humphrey's Executor.
"Several of Trump's early steps as president was to dismiss heads or commissioners of independent agencies, leading to lawsuits challenging these dismissals under Humphrey's Executor ."
Humphrey's Executor v. United States
[6] supported
A federal district court first reinstated Gwynne Wilcox, holding that the President's removal violated the statutory removal limit and that under Humphrey's Executor that limit did not unconstitutionally infringe the President's removal power.
"A federal district court first issued a decision reinstating Wilcox, holding that the President’s action violated the applicable statutory removal limitation and that, under Humphrey’s, the limitation did not unconstitutionally infringe on the President’s removal power."
PDF Trump v. Slaughter and the Future of For- Cause Removal Protections
[7] supported
Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) limited the broad removal power described in Myers to "purely executive" offices.
"The Taft Court's broad view of the president's "constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed" was soon thereafter limited in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935) to "purely executive" offices."
Myers v. United States
[8] supported
The Court says the first of those early agencies, the Revolutionary War Debt Commission, was composed solely of Presidential appointees.
"the first of the three, the Revolutionary War Debt Commission, was composed solely of Presidential appointees"
PDF 25-332 Trump v. Slaughter (06/29/2026) - Supreme Court of the United States
[9] supported
In Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Humphrey's Executor applied to multimember agencies that do not wield substantial executive power and should not be extended to new situations.
"In a 2020 decision Seila Law v. CFPB the Chief Justice wrote that Humphrey's Executor applied to multimember agencies "that do not wield substantial executive power" and would not be extended to "new situations"."
Humphrey's Executor v. United States
[10] supported
Courts initially applied Humphrey's Executor broadly to uphold for-cause removal protections for multimember boards meant to operate with some independence from presidential control and performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.
"Courts initially applied Humphrey's broadly to uphold for-cause removal protections for multimember boards intended to operate with some independence from presidential control and with functions that were characterized as “quasi-legislative” or quasi-judicial.”"
PDF Trump v. Slaughter and the Future of For- Cause Removal Protections
[11] supported
In 1935, the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executor upheld a statute protecting an FTC Commissioner from politically motivated removal, a multi-member commission context.
"In 1935, in Humphrey's Executor the Supreme Court upheld a statute protecting the FTC Commissioner from politically motivated removal."
Myers v. United States
[12] documented
The Court states that its precedent confirms that the President may remove his subordinates at will.
"What text, history, and structure settle, the Court’s precedent confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at will."
PDF 25-332 Trump v. Slaughter (06/29/2026) - Supreme Court of the United States
[13] supported
In May 2025, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 unsigned order on an emergency appeal from Trump, stayed the reinstatement of two independent regulators, Gwynne Wilcox of the NLRB and Cathy A. Harris of the MSPB, pending further review in lower courts.
"the Supreme Court stayed the reinstatement of two independent regulators, Gwynne Wilcox of the National Labor Relations Board and chair Cathy A. Harris of the Merit Systems Protection Board , pending further review in lower courts."
Humphrey's Executor v. United States
[14] supported
In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court majority declared that if anything more is left of Humphrey's Executor, it is overruled.
"In Slaughter, the majority declared that “If anything more is left of Humphrey’s,” it is “overruled.”"
PDF Trump v. Slaughter and the Future of For- Cause Removal Protections
[15] supported
In Wiener v. United States, the Court said Humphrey's Executor "narrowly confined the scope of the Myers decision."
"In Wiener v. United States the Court said the Humphrey's decision "narrowly confined the scope of the Myers decision"."
Myers v. United States
[16] supported
In Seila Law (2020), the Roberts Court reaffirmed the core holding of Myers that the president generally has an unencumbered removal power.
"In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020), the Roberts Court reaffirmed the core holding of Myers that the president generally has an unencumbered removal power."
Myers v. United States
[17] supported
The Court recognized that the President may generally remove officers at will, subject to two exceptions.
"The Court recognized that the President may generally remove officers at will. However, the Court stated that there were two exceptions to this rule."
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
[18] supported
The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court and treated the Supreme Court's Humphrey's Executor and Morrison decisions upholding for-cause removal as controlling.
"On appeal at the Ninth Circuit , the circuit panel affirmed the district court's ruling, and agreed that the Supreme Court's prior decisions upholding for-cause removal in Humphrey's Executor and Morrison were controlling."
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
[19] supported
The en banc D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp. v. CFPB (2018) found the CFPB's structure constitutional, and the Ninth Circuit referred approvingly to that decision.
"It also referred approvingly to the en banc decision of the DC Circuit in PHH Corp. v. CFPB (2018), in which the Circuit found that the structure of the CFPB was constitutional."
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
[20] supported
Most courts that had considered the question found that for-cause removal of the CFPB director was constitutional.
"Most courts that had considered the question found that for-cause removal of the CFPB director was constitutional."
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
[21] documented
The President has the authority to remove a member of the Amtrak Reform Board without cause.
"The President may remove a member of the Amtrak Reform Board without cause."
Holdover and Removal of Members of Amtrak's Reform Board (Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, 2003-09-22)
[22] supported
In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court held that heads of multi-member independent agencies who exercise executive power may be removed by the president at will, without the statutory 'for cause' protection.
"the Court held that heads of multi-member independent agencies who exercise executive power — including rulemaking, adjudication, and civil enforcement power — may be removed by the president at will, without the “for cause” protection provided by Congress."
The End of For-Cause Removal? Supreme Court Reshapes Removal Protections for Independent Agency Leadership
[23] supported
The Slaughter decision overturned Humphrey's Executor, which had shielded heads of independent regulatory agencies from presidential removal at will for nine decades.
"This decision overturned foundational precedent in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that for nine decades has shielded heads of independent regulatory agencies from presidential removal at will."
The End of For-Cause Removal? Supreme Court Reshapes Removal Protections for Independent Agency Leadership
[24] supported
In the Cook case, the Court of Appeals declined to stay the district court's injunction that kept Governor Cook in office, so the government went to the Supreme Court.
"The Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunction, and the government appealed to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal"
The End of For-Cause Removal? Supreme Court Reshapes Removal Protections for Independent Agency Leadership
[25] supported
In Trump v. Cook, the Court said any definition of 'cause' for Federal Reserve Governors requires a 'substantial threshold' showing that turns on whether the cause implies an unfitness for the office or is a pretext for a more congenial replacement.
"which requires a “substantial threshold” showing that turns on whether the “cause assigned” truly “implies an unfitness for the place,” or is instead a pretext to secure a “more congenial” replacement."
The End of For-Cause Removal? Supreme Court Reshapes Removal Protections for Independent Agency Leadership